Simon Willison’s Weblog

MDN: Subdomain takeovers (via) MDN have a page about subdomain takeover attacks that focuses more on CNAME records: if you have a CNAME pointing to a common delegated hosting provider but haven’t yet provisioned your virtual host there, someone else might beat you to it and use it for an XSS attack.

“Preventing subdomain takeovers is a matter of order of operations in lifecycle management for virtual hosts and DNS.”

I now understand why Google Cloud make your “prove” your ownership of a domain before they’ll let you configure it to host e.g. a Cloud Run instance. # 5:31 am

I stumbled across a nasty XSS hole involving DNS A records. Found out today that an old subdomain that I had assigned an IP address to via a DNS A record was serving unexpected content—turned out I’d shut down the associated VPS and the IP had been recycled to someone else, so their content was now appearing under my domain. It strikes me that if you got really unlucky this could turn into an XSS hole—and that new server could even use Let’s Encrypt to obtain an HTTPS certificate for your subdomain.

I’ve added “audit your A records” to my personal security checklist. # 5:27 am