GitHub Copilot Chat: From Prompt Injection to Data Exfiltration (via) Yet another example of the same vulnerability we see time and time again.
If you build an LLM-based chat interface that gets exposed to both private and untrusted data (in this case the code in VS Code that Copilot Chat can see) and your chat interface supports Markdown images, you have a data exfiltration prompt injection vulnerability.
The fix, applied by GitHub here, is to disable Markdown image references to untrusted domains. That way an attack can't trick your chatbot into embedding an image that leaks private data in the URL.
Previous examples: ChatGPT itself, Google Bard, Writer.com, Amazon Q, Google NotebookLM. I'm tracking them here using my new markdown-exfiltration tag.
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