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Items tagged security, google in 2024

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Understand errors and warnings better with Gemini (via) As part of Google's Gemini-in-everything strategy, Chrome DevTools now includes an opt-in feature for passing error messages in the JavaScript console to Gemini for an explanation, via a lightbulb icon.

Amusingly, this documentation page includes a warning about prompt injection:

Many of LLM applications are susceptible to a form of abuse known as prompt injection. This feature is no different. It is possible to trick the LLM into accepting instructions that are not intended by the developers.

They include a screenshot of a harmless example, but I'd be interested in hearing if anyone has a theoretical attack that could actually cause real damage here. # 17th May 2024, 10:10 pm

Google NotebookLM Data Exfiltration (via) NotebookLM is a Google Labs product that lets you store information as sources (mainly text files in PDF) and then ask questions against those sources—effectively an interface for building your own custom RAG (Retrieval Augmented Generation) chatbots.

Unsurprisingly for anything that allows LLMs to interact with untrusted documents, it’s susceptible to prompt injection.

Johann Rehberger found some classic prompt injection exfiltration attacks: you can create source documents with instructions that cause the chatbot to load a Markdown image that leaks other private data to an external domain as data passed in the query string.

Johann reported this privately in the December but the problem has not yet been addressed. UPDATE: The NotebookLM team deployed a fix for this on 18th April.

A good rule of thumb is that any time you let LLMs see untrusted tokens there is a risk of an attack like this, so you should be very careful to avoid exfiltration vectors like Markdown images or even outbound links. # 16th April 2024, 9:28 pm

900 Sites, 125 million accounts, 1 vulnerability (via) Google’s Firebase development platform encourages building applications (mobile an web) which talk directly to the underlying data store, reading and writing from “collections” with access protected by Firebase Security Rules.

Unsurprisingly, a lot of development teams make mistakes with these.

This post describes how a security research team built a scanner that found over 124 million unprotected records across 900 different applications, including huge amounts of PII: 106 million email addresses, 20 million passwords (many in plaintext) and 27 million instances of “Bank details, invoices, etc”.

Most worrying of all, only 24% of the site owners they contacted shipped a fix for the misconfiguration. # 18th March 2024, 6:53 pm

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