How We Executed a Critical Supply Chain Attack on PyTorch (via) Report on a now handled supply chain attack reported against PyTorch which took advantage of GitHub Actions, stealing credentials from some self-hosted task runners.
The researchers first submitted a typo fix to the PyTorch repo, which gave them status as a “contributor” to that repo and meant that their future pull requests would have workflows executed without needing manual approval.
Their mitigation suggestion is to switch the option from ’Require approval for first-time contributors’ to ‘Require approval for all outside collaborators’.
I think GitHub could help protect against this kind of attack by making it more obvious when you approve a PR to run workflows in a way that grants that contributor future access rights. I’d like a “approve this time only” button separate from “approve this run and allow future runs from user X”.
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